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SKEPTICISM AND POLITICS IN THE DOMAIN

OF RIGHTS
James M. O'Fallon*
In the prologue to his book, The Constitution, the Courts, and
Human Rights, Michael Perry recalls Robert McCloskey's plaint that
the persistence of debate over the legitimacy of judicial review shows
little progress-like "an endless series of re-matches between two clubboxers who. . . have nothing further to learn from each other."' Perry
says that the task of constitutional theory is to escape this judgment. It
may be that the problem is not the impuissance of constitutional theory, but a misconception of what constitutes progress. In McCloskey's
metaphor there are no knockouts; so evidently in constitutional debate.
But before we accept that as the measure of our work, we will do well
to ponder these remarks of Wittgenstein's:
Philosophy has made no progress? If somebody scratches where it itches,
does that count as progress? If not does that mean it was not an authentic scratch? Not an authentic itch? Couldn't this response to the stimu2
lus go on for quite a long time until a remedy for itching is found?
I.
If one were writing an intellectual history of constitutional law,
skepticism would emerge as a central conceptual feature with Holmes,
and the continuing critical response to the Warren Court would mark
its efflorescence. 3 Few, if any, constitutional scholars would carry the
skeptical program to the point of doubting the very possibility of law,
as some members of the loosely identified American Realist group did.4
For most, theories of interpretation and* historical claims narrow the
target of the skeptical artillery to individual rights issues in which the
evaluative aspect of judgment is inescapable.
Charles Black and Michael Perry are both strong defenders of judicial review, and particularly judicial review based on innominate

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon.
1. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 8
MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 290-91 (1972)).
2. L. WITTGENSTEIN, VERMISCHTE BERMERKUNGEN 163-64 (1977).

(1982) (quoting R.

3. 1 use skepticism very broadly, though I think it would be possible with time and effort to
identify a number of somewhat distinct forms of skepticism, including rights-skepticism, ruleskepticism, and court-skepticism, that have influenced constitutional theory.

4. See Rogat. Legal Realism, in 4
1967).
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rights.' Both have written books that tie the legitimacy of innominate
rights review to congressional power over jurisdiction.6 Notwithstanding this point of convergence, to which I will return, it is hard to imagine two more different books. The source of the difference is the weight
that each accords the skeptical objection to innominate rights review.
In the contrast between the books, we can take a rough measure of the
cost for constitutional theory of taking skepticism too seriously.
Black simply refuses to allow the skeptical doubt to get off the
ground. He does not make his case by stating and defending an abstract theory of law. Indeed, he insists that neither he nor anyone else
is ready to provide such a theory.7 Rather, he assumes that the ideal of
lawfulness abides in the ordinary practice of judicial decisionmaking,
and he proceeds by showing how the controversy that attends some exercises of judicial review can be dissipated by attention to the ways in
which those decisions are like all exercises of the judicial art.
Deciding according to law involves "reasoning from commitment"
the commitment to general principles of political morality marked
by the text and structure of the Constitution. Such reasoning inevitably
requires courts to make judgments of value that cannot be passed off as
choices already made in other times and places by other people. It is
not adherence to the view that "constitutional decision must never be
fed by any judgment of rightness, justice, or political wisdom that cannot be rigorously shown to have some kind of objective, quasi-official
validation outside the minds and hearts of those who decide" that
marks the lawfulness of decision. It is that "the element of reasoning
from commitment plays a part important enough to mark a serious
specific difference between decision according to law and other kinds of
decision."
By the method of example, Black shows reasoning from commitment at work in constitutional decisionmaking. What he does not, and
5. Black speaks of unnamed rights. C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAw 45-46
(1981). Perry adopts the interpretivist/noninterpretivist distinction. M. PERRY, supra note 1,at
10.
I do not propose to get into an argument here over which term is more appropriate. My
choice reflects my belief that the interpretivist/noninterpretivist distinction depends on a theory of
interpretation that is itself controversial. My view is that the issue of central importance in the
cases where legitimacy seems problematic is what rights do people have? I do not believe that
anything I say here about Perry's book is dependent upon which term one uses to refer to the
instances of judicial review under discussion. Where employing Perry's language seems important
as a matter of exposition, I will use quotation marks to indicate that I am mentioning, rather than
using the terms.
6. C. BLACK, supra note 5, at 26, 37-39; M. PERRY, supra note I, at 128-35.
7. C. BLACK, supra note 5,at 32.
8. Id. at 81.
9. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
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perhaps cannot, show is the conclusion that reaches out and compels
agreement. Black embraces the fact that our constitutional commitment is to general principles, necessarily vague, and, therefore, to uncertainty.10 That he can do this without apparent discomfort is perhaps
the clearest sign that he has evaded the siren call of skepticism.
With Perry it is very different. He allows the challenge of skepticism to take hold, and attempts to defeat it on a battlefield it has chosen. The result is a kind of conceptual schizophrenia, in which the positions taken in opposition to skepticism destroy that which they were
designed to defend.
The skeptical camp in constitutional argument is usually pitched
on the ground of the supposed nonobjectivity or nondemonstrability of
normative judgments supporting innominate rights claims. Perry purports to reject skepticism by adhering to the view that society does and
should "take seriously the possibility that there are right answers to
political-moral problems.""1 But the difficulty he has in shaking the insidious influence of skepticism shows through some aspects of the quite
extraordinary defense of innominate rights review that he presents.
First, Perry deploys what he calls "functional justifications" for
both "interpretive" and "noninterpretive" judicial review. "Interpretive" judicial review is justified because it serves the function of fulfilling the framers' intent that the Constitution be treated as law."
"Noninterpretive" judicial review is justified because it allows us "to
keep faith with two of the most basic aspects of our collective selfunderstanding:" - namely, commitment to democracy and commitment to moral growth. 18
The sense of justification in both instances is obscure. The fact
that something serves a particular function does not directly justify it.
It may have been a fact that cannibalism provided a vital protein supplement to the Aztec diet. If so, that fact certainly did not justify the
practice.
In fact, if the functional justifications justify, it is because they are
enthymematic, containing suppressed normative premises that, if exposed, might open Perry's argument to skeptical criticism. With regard
to "interpretive" judicial review, the suppressed premise is that we
ought to comply with the framers' intent. This proposition is not likely
to draw much fire from the skeptics like Bork and Rehnquist who have
Perry's attention. But the difficulties with intentionalism that Paul
10.
Ii.
12.

Id. at 80.

13.

Id. at 101. The "commitment to democracy" function is served only by subjecting in-

M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 107.
Id. at 15.

nominate rights review to congressional control over jurisdiction.
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Brest has identified are real."' Henry Monaghan, no friend of freewheeling judicial review, has said: "It may very well be that those people who believe in the theory of original intent, like I do, will suffer
their ultimate downfall because they can't establish [a theory of original intent] with enough coherence to satisfy anybody."1 " If this justification escapes skeptical criticism, it will be evidence for the opportunism of the skeptics rather than for the invulnerability of the premise.
As for "noninterpretive" review, the inarticulate presupposition is
that we ought to keep faith with both mentioned aspects of our selfunderstanding, rather than, say, working to rid ourselves of the silly
belief that there is such a thing as moral progress. This is just the sort
of premise with which the skeptics would have a field day. Perry anticipates this, and attempts to set it aside, saying that he will "not defend
the proposition that we should take seriously the possibility that there
are right answers" because his book is not "a metaethical treatise."''
However, it is not just skeptics who have grounds for objecting to his
functional justification. If Perry were to write the "metaethical treatise" to confound the skeptics on the existence of right answers to
moral questions, he would have shown just that there are right answers
to moral questions. The justification for "noninterpretive" judicial review would remain to be made.
This point may be illuminated by recalling Learned Hand's famous remark regarding Platonic Guardians. 7 Of course, Hand did not
believe in the Forms. But, his objection to rule by Guardians would still
have cogency if he did know how to pick them. "If they were in charge,
I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least
theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs. '" Just as the
fact that science is objective does not provide an objective justification
for pursuing science, so knowing that there are moral truths does not
itself justify making their pursuit a part of law. 9
The attempt to avoid skepticism by functional justifications simply
leaves some work to be done - the work of establishing the acceptability of the suppressed normative premises. Perry's other nods to skepticism are much more pernicious. He undermines the role of reason in

14. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv.
204 (1980).
15. Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535-36
(1981) (remarks by Professor Monaghan).
16. M. PERRY, supra note I, at 102.
17. "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even
ifI knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73

(1958).
18. Id.

19.

See B. WILLIAMS,

MORALITY

30-31 (1972).
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innominate rights review, and he takes up the position that a judge
ought to decide cases according to his own values. The consequence is
that innominate rights review is no longer law in any meaningful sense.
One is left wondering why, if this ought to be done, it ought to be done
by judges.
Perry comes to the evisceration of innominate rights review by a
tortuous path. He begins by asserting that the task of innominate rights
review is to seek right answers to moral questions.2 0 But he rejects the
claims of all existing systematic moral theories to provide right answers, and is "reluctant to assume that a single moral system will ever
have an exclusive claim on the mind of man."2 From that, he moves to
the view (hesitantly stated) that "the correctness of a given answer to a
human rights problem inheres in something other than the particular
set of reasons -

the particular rationalization or explanation -

of-

fered in support of the answer. "22 Reasons are not to be dispensed with,
but they are to be understood as serving a function similar to myth
("Man

. . .

seems to require rationalization, just as he seems to require

myth")" rather than as doing the work those who employ them seriously take them to be doing. A bit of crude relativism creeps in here:
particular rationalizations are apparently untrustworthy because they
are "'relative to linguistic and theoretical schemes which are historically and culturally conditioned and therefore reformable.' "92
The closest thing to a criterion of judgment that emerges from all
this is that "a right answer

. . .

frequently represents, in the United

States [is it only in the United States that moral theory is deficient?], a
point at which a variety of philosophical and religious systems of moral
thought and belief converge. "25 Such convergence at least counts as
evidence for "orthopraxis" - "right" action that transcends particular
rationalization.' 6
One might expect that Perry would commend to the judges the
method of examining the major religious and moral theories for points
of convergence, in order to determine what rights people have. Instead,
he gives them license to look into their own hearts. I will have more to
say about this in a moment.
It would appear that the corrosive effect of skepticism has eaten
away all the ground under Perry's defense of human rights, leaving him
20.

M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 102.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 109.
Id.

Id. at 109-10.
Id. at I10 (footnote omitted).
ld. at 109 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 110.
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only the belief. His response is akin to the traditional fideistic counter
to skepticism - where reason fails, faith alone sustains. The judge is
called to prophecy.
Not much can be said once things get to this point. Either one
hears the call, or one does not. There is evidence, however, that even
Perry does not hear it clearly.
The judge's prophecy is to serve as moral critique. The practice of
giving reasons is not to be jettisoned, though the sense in which they
are reasons -

can be understood to function as reasons -

would seem

to have been fatally compromised. That this is so is exhibited in the
way Perry discusses judicial enforcement of personal values.
Perry chides Owen Fiss for failing to follow the "logic" of his
view, that judges ought to pursue truth, right, and justice, to the conclusion that they ought to act on their personal views of what is -true,
right, or just.2 7 But the "logic" of Fiss' position leads to Perry's conclusion only on the skeptical premise that there is nothing to morality except personal will or taste. 8 If that premise is accepted, Perry's adjuration that judges enforce "values ideally arrived at through, and tested
in the crucible of, a very deliberate search for right answers" and values derived "not in an unself-critical way" surely sets them to a hollow
task.2 9
The skepticism that Holmes bequeathed to constitutional theory
cannot be understood apart from his attachment to the premises of
19th-century scientific positivism. 0 His view that the "true science of
the law

. . .

consists in the establishment of its postulates from within

upon accurately measured social desires"'" and his view that judges
ought not interfere with the natural outcome of dominant social opinion3 s stand on each other's backs. Science conceived on the positivist
model may seem, across a narrow front of observable, regularly recurring phenomena, to defeat skepticism. But as a richer understanding of
science renders the positivist version of the fact-value distinction untenable, we may draw a different lesson from the apparent success of science: not how to defeat skepticism but how fruitfully to ignore it recognizing that while the claim to truth has limits, it is nonetheless
27. Id. at 123.
28. It is possible, I suppose, that Perry means only to insist on the fact that the inevitable
location of moral judgment is with the individual. But no one, and certainly not Fiss, is likely to
deny that. If that is Perry's point, the emphasis he puts on it is perverse.
29. M. PERRY, supra note I, at 123.
30. On the significance of positivism for Holmes' thought, see Gordon, Holmes' Common
Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719 (1982).
31. 0. W. HOLMES, Law In Science and Science In Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 22526 (1920).
32. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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worth making. 3
We might start the business of defusing skepticism by asking the
skeptics among us to live by their premises. Holmes often spoke of purifying the law by purging it of every term of moral significance. 4
Along that line, we could suggest that arguments over the legitimacy of
instances of judicial review be abandoned in favor of a normatively
dentured term like "validity." If we then set out to rigorously define
the criteria of validity for the system, we would, I suspect, soon find the
skeptics among us characterizing the nature of the constitutional system by deploying just the kind of judgments that they insist cannot be
made. (It would, of course, be bad faith to insist that they give the kind
of justification for their judgments that would satisfy a skeptic.)
Few of Holmes' modern disciples would be willing to follow him as
far as a remark to Lady Pollock suggests he went: "I feel in these days
that I would pay a dollar and a half and go across the street to see a
good stiff prejudice of any kind."' 36 The representative skeptics of
Perry's, book speak of personal moral judgments and values, rather than
simple prejudice.37 Where skepticism drives Perry, to the abandonment
of law, even Holmes would not go.
II.
In the present political climate, the proposition that the legitimacy
of innominate rights review depends on congressional control over jurisdiction, a point on which Perry and Black agree, is likely to draw a
great deal of attention. To think of Jesse Helms taking comfort and
sustenance from Charles Black is to give new meaning to the trope
concerning politics and bedfellows.
For both authors, congressional control over jurisdiction is a consequence of the primacy that the commitment to democracy has in our
theory of political legitimacy. However, it is important not to overstate
the degree of agreement between Black and Perry on the point. It is
plain that Black believes the ongoing democratic validation of judicial
33. See generally H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981).
34. See 0. W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 179 (1920).
35. While modern political scientists following Weber have tried to squeeze the normative
connotations out of "legitimacy," it is clear that they survive in the battle over judicial review. See
H. PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 280-84 (1972).
36. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 74 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
37. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 103 (quoting Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) and Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution. 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976)). Even Holmes had his "can't helps," though they are perhaps
least to be trusted in a skeptic. The skepticism that gave us the dissents in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919): Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918); and Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) gave
way to the "burning theme" of Buck v. Bell. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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review, provided by the failure of Congress to withdraw jurisdiction, to
be essential to the legitimacy of the enterprise.s He displays impatience with suggestions that congressional power in this regard is not
plenary, and indicates that were it otherwise he would have to consider
a constitutional amendment. 8 '
With Perry, the attachment to a democratic ground found in congressional control over jurisdiction is a marriage of convenience. He
wants to deliver a knockout punch to those who make the democratic
objection to innominate rights review. He believes he can do that by
giving them their strongest case, represented by Robert Bork's political
theory and Raoul Berger's historicism, and then pulling out the string
of congressional control to tie his own highly problematic theory of innominate rights review together. The control goes no further than the
theory requires: it extends to "noninterpretive" but not to "interpretive" review, though on Perry's account this encompasses the most important modern exercises of judicial review. 0 He is clearly prepared to
abandon congressional control if the ploy does not work. 1
The important thing to note about submission of jurisdiction to
legislative control is what it does to the sense of "right" involved in
innominate rights review. No longer could rights be thought of as
something we have independent of majority will. There might be collateral consequences, depending on the way control over jurisdiction was
exercised, which would stand in the way of making the jurisdictional
question a straightforward referendum on the right. But the fact is that
it would leave us only those rights that no determined majority could
be mustered to oppose.
This consequence of legislative control over jurisdiction shows its
structural unsuitability for a political enterprise in which the commitment to democracy must find accommodation with commitment to the
sense that we do in fact have rights against the majority."" It is no
accident that while academic debate over Roe v. Wade43 has focused on
the legitimacy of judicial recognition of rights not named in the Constitution, the streets have been occupied by claims and denials of rights.
It is "Right to Life" vs. "Right to Choose." The "Electoral Accountability" banners are rare.

38.
39.
40.
41.
(remarks

C. BLACK, supra note 5, at 26, 37-39.
Id. at 78-79.
M. PERRY, supra note I, at 130.
Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 529 (1981)
by Professor Perry).

42. See generally R.

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

90-94 (1977); Sager, Rights

Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 417 (1981).
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Both Black and Perry propose legislative control over jurisdiction
as a means of accommodating rights adjudication with the supposed
fundamental axiom of democratic government." But if, as suggested,
that proposal compromises the sense in which we can think of ourselves
as right holders against government, there is good reason to question
the fundamentality of the democratic axiom. Rather than continue to
scratch the democratic itch, '" we might better occupy ourselves with
careful thought about what rights we have.

44. Perry places a great deal of weight on the "interpretivist"-"noninterpretivist" distinction, which might be thought to preserve the sense of having rights in those areas of jurisdiction
protected by the "interpretivist" label. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 130. Passing objections to his
argument for limiting congressional power in this way would, on Perry's own account of which
decisions can be counted as "interpretivist," leave our sense of ourselves as right holders virtually
contentless.
45. One source of the itch is, again, Holmes. In this context it is useful to remember that
Holmes acceded to democracy not because it was right but because it was there, and provided an
appropriate ground for "scientific" judgment.
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